An Obsession With Surpluses

No, I’m not addressing the government deficit. Rather this is about Malaysia’s (slowly) diminishing current account surplus. I wrote about it at length last year (link), but here’s another flavour of the same argument (abstract):

Current Account Deficits:The Australian Debate
Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell and Christopher Kent

This paper documents the clear change of view, which has taken place in Australia over the past three decades or so, concerning the relevance of the current account deficit for policy. Historical experience under a fixed exchange rate regime suggested that large persistent deficits were unsustainable and could leave the economy vulnerable to sudden reversals in sentiment. These concerns persisted after the floating of the Australian dollar and financial deregulation, and it was thought that all arms of policy should help to rein in the then much larger current account deficits. However, these policies were shown to be ineffective and, by the early 1990s, the argument that current account deficits represent the optimal outcomes of decisions made by ‘consenting adults’ gained wide support. This paper presents some empirical evidence consistent with optimal smoothing in the face of temporary shocks; the persistence of the deficit is attributed to a modest degree of impatience relative to the rest of the world. Although it is now widely accepted that policy should not seek to influence the current account balance, the issue of external vulnerability remains of interest. Here, country-specific considerations are important, and it is argued that the factors that have made Australia relatively resilient to external shocks are also those that helped to attract foreign capital in the first place.

It's an old paper, but still relevant. I'll note in passing here two things:

1. The underlying argument is similar to my own – whether the current account is in surplus or deficit (and the extent of that imbalance) is primarily driven by factors in the domestic economy, not the external sector or the exchange rate;
2. Australia now has almost no FX reserves to speak of, despite being heavily exposed to trade and commodity prices, and a foreign presence in their bond market that exceeds ours. IIRC, they barely have one month cover of retained imports.

The implication is that all adjustments take place in prices instead of levels i.e. the AUD exchange rate adjusts, not their level of reserves. Despite this difference, the MYRAUD cross rate is one of the most stable I’ve ever seen outside of a pegged exchange rate. Or to put it more bluntly – despite not having accumulated “insurance” (FX reserves) against capital outflows, and thus deliberately exposing the exchange rate to greater volatility, the AUD does not appear to be any more volatile than the MYR is. There was an exception to this, running roughly from October 2008-May 2009, coinciding with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and running to the beginnings of the global recovery. But this was more the exception that proved the rule.

Notes:

Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell and Christopher Kent, "Current Account Deficits:The Australian Debate", Reserve Bank of Australia Discussion Paper 2007-02, March 2007

Rent Control Doesn’t Work Either

I’ve been falling behind in my blogging – work commitments, travelling, time with the family etc have really eaten into my writing. One of my new year resolutions is to become more active again. Nevertheless, blogging is still likely to take a little bit of a back seat, though I’ll try to keep up to at least once a week, if not more. Just don’t expect long rants.

First up, a paper on the effectiveness of rent controls on housing (abstract):

The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants,Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco
Rebecca Diamond, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian

In this paper, we exploit quasi-experimental variation in the assignment of rent control in San Francisco to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the rental market as a whole. Leveraging new micro data which tracks an individual’s migration over time, we find that rent control increased the probability a renter stayed at their address by close to 20 percent. At the same time, we find that landlords whose properties were exogenously covered by rent control reduced their supply of available rental housing by 15%, by either converting to condos/TICs, selling to owner occupied, or redeveloping buildings. This led to a city-wide rent increase of 7% and caused $5 billion of welfare losses to all renters. We develop a dynamic, structural model of neighborhood choice to evaluate the welfare impacts of our reduced form effects. We find that rent control offered large benefits to impacted tenants during the 1995-2012 period, averaging between $2300 and $6600 per person each year, with aggregate benefits totaling over $390 million annually. The substantial welfare losses due to decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against large rent increases was provided as a form of government social insurance, instead of a regulated mandate on landlords.

Frisco (I lived there for a few years, so feel entitled to use the short form) is an interesting case. Silicon Valley is next door, and the agglomeration of high tech companies in the area have both increased demand for housing (from internal and external immigrants) as well as boosted house prices substantially. Couple that with Californian zoning regulations, and Frisco has a housing market that is one of the most unaffordable in the world. Rent control is one solution, but the paper estimates that the costs far outweigh the benefits.

This isn’t to say that rent controls don’t work at all, but the specific circumstances in Malaysia are similar – inadequate supply, internal migration to economic centres of activity, increased compliance costs. So I’m comfortable extrapolating the results to our domestic housing problem. The solution is still to reduce barriers to contruction and increase supply in the right market segments.

Notes

Rebecca Diamond, Tim McQuade, & Franklin Qian , "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants,Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco", paper presented at the NBER Conference on Public Economics, October 26-27 2017

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: December 2017 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

December saw the Ringgit gaining for a fourth straight month across all the indexes. The NEER hit 4.1% yoy, while the REER rose 2.1%. On the month, gains accelerated, with the Ringgit gaining 1.7% in nominal terms, and 1.5% in real terms. Gains were across the board, with appreciation recorded against all 15 currencies in the indexes, the first time that has happened since April 2016.

The largest (m-o-m) gains were against the JPY (2.33%), IDR (2.30%), HKD (2.25%) and USD (2.16%). The smallest gains were against the KRW (0.71%) and GBP (0.86%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to December 2017
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for November/December 2017
3. Trade weights have been updated to 3Q2017. This caused revisions to the indexes from January 2017 onwards

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: November 2017 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

The Ringgit has continued to strengthen across October and November. The yoy growth numbers all turned positive in November with the exception of the Real ASEAN sub-index, while mom growth has been positive for three months running. Gains were broad based, though skewed a little more against the majors, and less so against regional counterparts. The Broad Nominal Index rose 0.36% in October and 1.26% in November, while the Broad Real Index rose 0.72% in October and 1.30% in November.

In November, the only drop recorded was against the KRW (-1.35%), which has been on a tear this year. The biggest gain recorded was against the AUD (Oct: 1.89%; Nov: 3.64%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to November 2017
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for October/November 2017

Chart of the Week: Don’t Bet On Real Trade Growth

It was a good run, but Malaysia’s trade growth numbers will “normalise” within the next couple of months (RM millions):

However, this is partly a price phenomenon (index numbers; 2010=100):

On the import side, it’s food, fuel, and edible oils and fats; on the export side, fuel and electronics. Import volume, like imports overall, appear to have plateaued, but there’s still some export volume upside, which is still fairly broad-based.

Two conclusions: Despite the steady increase in export volume, I think this runup is at an end – there’s a lot of volatility in the sub-indices, which means that this increase is hiding a lot of movement underneath. The price trends are mostly oil & gas related. Trade volume in the rest of East Asia has also plateaued, so most of the double-digit growth we’re still seeing across the region is simply from the low base last year. That implies growth rates will gradually drop to “normal” levels, which means something in the low single digits again, as the base shifts to the higher numbers seen earlier this year.

Taxing Land

I’ve been meaning to highlight this, but better late than never (excerpt):

Faster Growth Begins With a Land Tax in U.S. Cities
This would lower land costs, encouraging affordable housing and more density.
By Noah Smith

…In cities, especially large metropolises like New York and tech hubs like San Francisco, the land under a building is often worth a lot more than the buildings itself. When a city gets denser or more desirable, lucky landowners reap windfalls as land prices appreciate. But these windfalls aren’t just unfair -- they raise both rents and housing prices, pushing potential new residents out of a city and choking off its growth.

So it makes sense to tax the value of land. A land-value tax, or LVT, is like a property tax, but with a deduction for the value of buildings and other improvements. The tax would reduce land prices and increase the incentive to build more, which in turn will help drive down rents, making a city more affordable. And because land is a fixed quantity, taxing it doesn’t shrink the economy like taxes on wages and capital sometimes do. Also, since you’re taxing a windfall, it’s hard for landowners to argue that the tax isn’t fair. The money raised with a land-value tax can be spent building affordable housing for the poor.

Therefore, a land-value tax is an efficient and fair way to take a city that now works only for lucky prosperous landowners, and turn it into a place where the working class can afford to make a decent life….

…In the U.S., Pennsylvania is the LVT trailblazer. More than a dozen cities in that state use split-rate taxation -- one tax on land value, and a lower rate on improvements, such as buildings. Some of these experiments, like the one in Altoona, have failed, probably due to ineffective implementation and businesses’ failure to understand the novel tax structure.

But in Pittsburgh, a large city where valuable locations are scarce, the tax has been a success….

BNM Watch: The Countdown Has Started

Yesterday’s MPC statement is about as clear a statement of intent as you can get from a central bank (excerpt; emphasis added):

Monetary Policy Statement

...At the current level of the OPR, the stance of monetary policy remains accommodative. Given the strength of the global and domestic macroeconomic conditions, the Monetary Policy Committee may consider reviewing the current degree of monetary accommodation. This is to ensure the sustainability of the growth prospects of the Malaysian economy....

Thoughts on Alternative Budget 2018

So, I’ve finally sat down to read through Pakatan Harapan’s alternative budget for 2018. There are some good ideas here, and a fair share of bad ones, but no more than expected. The numbers are bonkers, but I expected that since this is more a political manifesto than a real fiscal document. I’ll give most of it a pass except the more egregious ones, and like many, I note that some of the policy objectives and prescriptions are contradictory. At least one proposal has me upset, but I’ll leave that for the very last.

Can the (overall) numbers be achieved? I’d say yes. If the government really wanted to, they could go with a balanced budget tomorrow. But I think it would involve as much cutting the provision of public goods and services, as it would be some putative “savings'” from reducing corruption and improving governance. I’m sceptical that there’s that much savings to be had from that source.

Thoughts on Budget 2018

I missed most of the Budget speech this year, having just landed from an overseas trip. That and jet lag meant I’m late in catching up on things, and today’s the first day I’m comfortable enough with the numbers and the anmouncements to actually comment on them. I’ll have something more to say about the opposition’s alternative budget(s) later.

First up, on the economic forecasts (2017: 5.2%-5.7%; 2018: 5.0%-5.5%). They’re eminently achievable, especially with the high frequency data coming in. The numbers continue to surprise on the upside, though some of that is coming from the low base we had last year. Even if we see just trend growth for the rest of 2017 and into 2018, the forecasts should bear out.

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: September 2017 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

September was a turnaround month for the Ringgit. The year on year changes are still negative, but all six indices posted gains on the month, and the best positive performance since May-17. Capital inflows were apparently the main reason. The Broad Nominal index rose 1.26%, while the Broad Real index rose 1.04%.

On a bilateral basis, the Ringgit rose against 14 out of 15 currencies. The biggest gains were against the JPY (+2.66%), the INR (+2.49%), the KRW (+1.86%), the USD (+1.72%), and the PHP (+1.70%). The only drop recorded was against the GBP (-1.22%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to September 2017
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for August/September 2017

Central Banks Can’t Go Bankrupt

Continuing on the FX theme and the recent RCI, something’s puzzled me for quite a few years. Why did BNM and/or the government decide to “amortise” the FX losses, rather than take them on BNM’s balance sheet at once?

For the uninitiated, BNM’s losses of approximately RM31.4b in the early 1990s were progressively “written-off” on a gradual basis over a period of 10 years beginning in 1993. My memory on this is a bit hazy, but my understanding was that the losses were carried as memo items, and periodically written off against the Bank’s annual profits (and euphemistically carried as “deferred expenditure” on the asset side of the Bank’s balance sheet).

The main effect of this clever piece of accounting, or boondoggle depending on your perspective, is that it preserved the illusion that BNM’s equity base remained in the black. Writing off the lossses at one go would have wiped out BNM’s equity and accumulated reserves (not to be confused with FX reserves) of about RM13.6b (at the end of 1991), resulting in the central bank being technically insolvent, or more vulgarly, bankrupt.

Chart of the Week: Valuing the Ringgit

I’ve done this exercise once before (see here), but this way is probably a lot more intuitive for most people. The TL:DR version – the Ringgit is undervalued, but not by much:

The chart above has the USDMYR exchange rate on the right, and the Fed’s USD broad nominal effective exchange rate on the left, from 2005 to the present. The correlation is very close – better than 95%. In other words, almost all the variation in the MYR exchange rate has come from movements in the USD rather than factors idiosyncratic to the MYR.

I won’t say that the gaps between the lines are good measures of the MYR’s over- or under-valuation, but they are indicative. In the MYR’s recent history, there’s been two episodes of obvious misalignment, roughly from mid-2015 to early-2016, and from the end of 2016 to the present.

The first you can probably call the 1MDB effect, and just like in my previous exercise, you can say it was indeed a factor in pushing down the MYR. However, the effect was short-lived, again roughly coinciding with the sale of Edra Energy.So to the idea that 1MDB, and Malaysian governance generally, has any bearing on the Ringgit exchange rate: please go away. You’re not relevant anymore.

The second coincided with the US elections and probably more pertinently, BNM’s reaction to the change in global capital flows it triggered. I’d call this the fear-of-capital-controls effect. It’s still persisting, and I’d call it a roughly 5% deviation from where the MYR should be (around RM4.00 to the USD).

The bottom line is: Yes, the Ringgit is undervalued, but probably not as much as people think.