Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: June 2018 Update

This post is seriously late, as I’ve just switched laptops and my editing software is being cantankerous. However, the NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

Despite the moves in the bilateral USDMYR exchange rate, there has been almost no movement in either the NEER and REER since February. This also applied to the narrow and ASEAN indexes as well. In other words, almost all the currency volatility of the past six months has been due to USD movements, with very little coming from other currencies. The nominal broad index was up 5.30% yoy, but just -0.15% on the month (REER: 4.78%, -0.15%).

Breaking down on a bilateral basis, movements were predictably mixed, with the Ringgit roughly up against half the basket and down on the other half. On a cumulative three month basis, the MYR has gained the most against the EUR (+3.15%), the GBP (+2.68%), the INR (+1.78%), the THB (+1.45%), and the AUD (+1.15%). The biggest losses were against the USD bloc countries in the basket, I.e. the USD (-2.35%), the HKD (-2.28%), and the VND (-2.18%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to June 2018
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for May/June 2018
3. Trade weights were updated to March 2018. This required revisions to all the indexes from Jan-18 onwards

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: March 2018 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

A late CPI release by Taiwan caused this update to be late, as well as an update to the trade weights, based on export-import data for 4Q17.

On contrast to the last few months, the Ringgit was largely stable for March 2018, though still tending to the upside.The nominal broad index was up 6.42% yoy, but just 0.05% on the month (REER: 6.23%, 0.06%). The picture for the sub-indexes was equally mixed, with the nominal broad index down –0.14% compared to February, but with the real index up 0.06%.

Still, gains were broad-based, with the Ringgit up against 11 currencies and down against just 4. The biggest gain was against the AUD (+1.52% mom), building further on gains since the middle of last year. The biggest decline was against the JPY (-1.58%), though this was after rising 5 out of the last 6 months.

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to March 2018
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for Feburary/March 2018
3. Trade weights were updated to December 2017. This required revisions to all the indexes from Jan-17 onwards

Historical Revisionism Redux

P. Gunasegaran demonstrates – yet again – that he doesn’t understand exchange rates (excerpt):

How successive governments impoverished M'sians

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS | At least two ways - both very wrong in the longer term - were used to support the export sector in Malaysia in believing that growth through exports was the right thing for a developing country like Malaysia.

But even though there was economic growth, which means more wealth was created, there was impoverishment too. But how could that be? Basically, those who were rich got richer and those who were poor got poorer.

How did the government achieve export competitiveness over the years? Through two measures. First, they reduced the number of things Malaysians generally could buy by going for a policy which weakened the ringgit. And two, they imported poverty by allowing the uncontrolled import of cheap labour.

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: February 2018 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

This update is a little late for a few reasons. First, I was travelling the whole of last week, and simply hadn’t the time. Second, there were major updates to a few of the CPI series (changes of base years), including the one for Malaysia, that required rejigging the spliced deflator series.

On the whole though, the picture hasn’t changed much since December 2017. The Ringgit was still climbing against most currencies, which resulted in a continued increase in all of the indexes. On the year, the nominal broad index was up 5.3% in January and 6.4% in February, while the real broad index was up 3.9% and 6.3%. The picture was broadly the same across all the sub-indexes.

On a bilateral basis, the Ringgit was up against 14 currencies in January and 11 in February (relative to the 15 that make up the broad index). The biggest gains were against regional currencies, with the only net declines over Jan-18-Feb-18 recorded against the EUR, JPY and CNY.

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to February 2018
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for January/Feburary 2018
3. CPI deflator data revisions were required for Malaysia, Thailand, and the Phillippines. This required revisions to the indexes from Jan-17 onwards

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: September 2017 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

September was a turnaround month for the Ringgit. The year on year changes are still negative, but all six indices posted gains on the month, and the best positive performance since May-17. Capital inflows were apparently the main reason. The Broad Nominal index rose 1.26%, while the Broad Real index rose 1.04%.

On a bilateral basis, the Ringgit rose against 14 out of 15 currencies. The biggest gains were against the JPY (+2.66%), the INR (+2.49%), the KRW (+1.86%), the USD (+1.72%), and the PHP (+1.70%). The only drop recorded was against the GBP (-1.22%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to September 2017
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for August/September 2017

Chart of the Week: Valuing the Ringgit

I’ve done this exercise once before (see here), but this way is probably a lot more intuitive for most people. The TL:DR version – the Ringgit is undervalued, but not by much:

The chart above has the USDMYR exchange rate on the right, and the Fed’s USD broad nominal effective exchange rate on the left, from 2005 to the present. The correlation is very close – better than 95%. In other words, almost all the variation in the MYR exchange rate has come from movements in the USD rather than factors idiosyncratic to the MYR.

I won’t say that the gaps between the lines are good measures of the MYR’s over- or under-valuation, but they are indicative. In the MYR’s recent history, there’s been two episodes of obvious misalignment, roughly from mid-2015 to early-2016, and from the end of 2016 to the present.

The first you can probably call the 1MDB effect, and just like in my previous exercise, you can say it was indeed a factor in pushing down the MYR. However, the effect was short-lived, again roughly coinciding with the sale of Edra Energy.So to the idea that 1MDB, and Malaysian governance generally, has any bearing on the Ringgit exchange rate: please go away. You’re not relevant anymore.

The second coincided with the US elections and probably more pertinently, BNM’s reaction to the change in global capital flows it triggered. I’d call this the fear-of-capital-controls effect. It’s still persisting, and I’d call it a roughly 5% deviation from where the MYR should be (around RM4.00 to the USD).

The bottom line is: Yes, the Ringgit is undervalued, but probably not as much as people think.

Historical Revisionism: The MYR and SGD in the 1980s

I came across this a couple of weeks ago, but didn’t have time to address it then (excerpt):

A kleptocracy premium for the ringgit
P Gunasegaram

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS | Without a doubt the ringgit is historically rather weak even if the economy still continues to grow at a relatively healthy pace – the latest figures show a good growth of 5.8% for the second quarter of the year….

…So why does the ringgit remain weak, trading at levels which are weaker than at the height of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis? What is it that is happening that keeps the ringgit level depressed? Perhaps it is due to a risk premium on the ringgit following the emergence of kleptocracy (re: 1MDB where as much as RM40 billion could be at risk, as thieves dip their fingers into money borrowed by a government company via bond issues) or apprehension over the ongoing spate of mega projects (re: the RM55 billion East Coast Rail Link whose cost may go to over RM100 billion….

Effective Exchange Rate Indexes: August 2017 Update

The NEER and REER page has been updated, as has the Google Docs version.

Summary

August was not a good month for the Ringgit, with drops posted across all six indices. Most of the losses were due to safe haven buying of the JPY and EUR, along with skepticism over the trajectory of US policy, both fiscal and monetary. The result was a -1.21% mom decline in the Narrow Nominal Index and a –1.17% drop in the Real Narrow Index.

On a bilateral basis it was a mixed bag, with gains recorded against 7 out of 15 currencies. The biggest drops were against the EUR (-2.31%), the JPY (-2.21%), the CNY (-1.42%), the AUD (-1.30%), and the THB (-1.26%). The largest gains were against the PHP (+0.84%) and the GBP (+0.47%).

Changelog:

1. Indexes have been updated to August 2017
2. CPI deflators and forecasts have been updated for July/August 2017
3. Trade weights have been updated to 2Q2017, which entails revisions for Mar-Jul 2017

Ringgit Futures in Singapore

BNM is upset:

BNM Stance on Ringgit Currency Derivatives Products in Offshore Market

The recent introduction of the ringgit futures at the Singapore Stock Exchange (SGX) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) or ICE Futures Singapore is inconsistent with Malaysia’s foreign exchange administration (FEA) policy and rules.

The Malaysian ringgit is a non-internationalised currency and thus, offshore trading of ringgit, in any form whether as a non-deliverable forward traded out of offshore financial centres or as a futures, options and other derivative contracts on exchanges outside of Malaysia, is against Malaysia’s policy.

Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) would like to remind all market participants to observe the existing FEA rules. Contravention of the FEA is an offence under the Financial Services Act 2013 and Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. Appropriate action under the law will be taken against any person that does not comply with prevailing rules and regulations. Foreign participants should access the onshore ringgit foreign exchange market to meet their financial needs, either directly with onshore licensed financial institutions or their Appointed Overseas Office (AOO).

ICYMI: Talking FX on BFM

Me, pontificating on the Ringgit and BNM’s new measures, over the past week:

FX: Onshore Versus Offshore

Imagine you have a widget to sell, something that helps pick apples. You offer the widget to a bunch of apple farmers, who think, yes, very useful, and offer you a price for it. Then you go to another set of orange growers and offer the same widget, and they’ll say, well we could use it, but its a different shape, and offer you a price half of what you got before (I’m assuming away the ability to arbitrage).

In essence, that’s the problem facing central banks with currencies traded both onshore and offshore – while the product’s the same, the market players are different and you’ll get different prices as a result.

The Ringgit and 1MDB

I’m still hearing people talking about the 1MDB effect on the Ringgit. Here’s what I’ve worked out:

MYR Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rate Indexes

I’ve been reworking my MYR exchange rate indexes, with the idea that I might put them out as a public service. There’s no official effective exchange rate indexes for the Ringgit, though there are many unofficial ones, on top of the indexes published by the IMF and the BIS. I’ve never been happy with any of them, mainly due to either a lack of documentation or the somewhat biased construction some of them have.

So here’s my version, based largely on international best practice (where I diverge is in using quarterly weights, instead of annual weights). There're six indexes altogether, comprising a broad 16 currency index, a more narrow 5 currency index of Malaysia's top trading partners, and an ASEAN index, with nominal and real versions for each.

I’m hoping to have these updated by the 7th of each month, though I can’t promise to meet that service level standard regularly. I’m hoping to follow this up with a technical document describing the construction of the indexes and data sources, as well as a running change log. The indexes aren’t perfect by any means, but the best I can come up with.

To access the data, click the permanent link on the top right of this blog post (“MYR Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates”), or click here.

Selling Low and Buying High

From the Malaysian Insider (excerpt):

Scandals, weak ringgit spurring Malaysians abroad to cash out EPF funds

Some Malaysians are making the drastic choice of renouncing their citizenship to withdraw their EPF savings before the age of 55. – The Malaysian Insider file pic, February 11, 2016.

When Joanne Koo first emigrated to Australia with her young family six years ago, she never planned on renouncing her citizenship as she was eager to hold on to her Malaysian ties, savings and investments.

However, earlier this month, Koo and her husband made a trip to Kuala Lumpur to surrender their Malaysian passports for the sole purpose of making a full withdrawal of their Employees Provident Fund (EPF) savings. (Savers are allowed full withdrawal at age 55.)

Seeing The Forest Through The Trees

Of all the mind-boggling things to suggest (excerpt):

Forex broker proposes raising Malaysia's interest rates

KUALA LUMPUR: Cutting interest rates is not an option for Bank Negara to prevent further weakness in the ringgit, said international forex broker FXTM.

A better option for the central bank would be to raise interest rates, said its chief market analyst Jameel Ahmad….

…He added that interest rates in Malaysia were relatively low, at 3.25%, compared to Indonesia at 7.5%.

“If you cut interest rates, people are not going to be encouraged to keep their capital in Malaysia.

“So, any reduced interest rates will not help the ringgit at all,” he said.

The Facts Of Life: Singapore’s Monetary Policy And The SGD Exchange Rate

Since the Ringgit has recovered (a little) there’s probably less of a need for this post. But given how angst ridden Malaysians are about Singapore and the Singapore Dollar (one commentator described it as humiliating), it’s probably still appropriate.

So here’s my take on this subject, and given how TDM is in the news so much these days, done “che det” style:

1. Once upon a time, the SGDMYR exchange rate was at parity. Now however, SGD1 buys MYR2.67. This is popularly viewed as a barometer of how badly the Malaysian economy has done vis-a-vis Singapore.

2. However, this would only be true if the SGD was a free floating currency. It is not; it is in actuality a policy variable.

Ringgit Under Pressure? Markets Are Irrational

I was going to write about this last week, but it got put on the back burner by the suspension of the fuel subsidy (excerpt):

Ringgit down to four-and-half-year low

KUALA LUMPUR: The ringgit has fallen to a fresh multi-year low against the US dollar, as sentiment has been somewhat dented by Malaysia’s shrinking current account surplus and slower economic growth in the third quarter of 2014.

At 5pm yesterday, the ringgit was being traded at 3.3565 against the greenback – the weakest level since May 2010. The ringgit is the second-worst performer in the region after the Singapore dollar so far this year. Over the last two weeks, it had declined 2% against the greenback….

…Analysts said the narrowing current account surplus put Malaysia in a less favourable position compared with the other countries….

February 2014 Consumer Price Index

Question: Has there been an increase in inflationary pressure in the last few months?

Question: Has weakness in the Ringgit contributed to domestic inflation in Malaysia?

I think the answers might surprise a few people, for so far the answer to the first is no (at least, not yet), and the answer to the second is both yes and no.

Let me explain.

The Asian Financial Crisis…15 Years Ago Today

On July 2 1997, the Bank of Thailand gave up the struggle to maintain their currency peg and let the Thai Baht devalue against the US dollar. Thus began one of the worst regional crises in the post-WWII era.

The reasons were complex and continue to be the subject of controversy, but the popular and official notion that the AFC was the result of foreign currency speculators alone is in my view very far off the mark. While hedge funds are known for taking risky bets, in this case it was a virtually no-risk bet. Pegged currencies that were over valued, current account deficits, unsustainable real estate bubbles (both residential and commercial), out-of-control bank lending, runaway money supply growth, and high external corporate borrowing provided ample grounds for a sell-down of Asian currencies.

It was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.

I’d also like to point out that with the exception of the Indonesian Rupiah, the three major currencies affected by the crisis – the Malaysian Ringgit, the Korean Won and the Thai Baht – all ended up post-crisis at close to the same levels against the Yuan as they had been before China’s 1993 devaluation. Now isn’t that suggestive (cross rates against the Yuan; higher values indicate appreciation):

But whether you believe the crisis was a result of a foreign conspiracy, external pressures and hot money flows, or the cumulative results of policy mistakes, this was a seminal event in the economic and financial development of East Asia.

May we never forget that it happened or the lessons that we’ve from it.

3Q Forex Update

What a difference a few months make. With increasing uncertainty over global growth and the threat of defaults in the Euro area, there’s been a general retreat from emerging market currencies to “safe-haven” currencies such as the Yen, the Swiss Franc and especially the USD.

No surprise then that the trade-weighted indexes have both dropped (index numbers; 2000=100):