Showing posts with label VoxEU. Show all posts
Showing posts with label VoxEU. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Mundell-Fleming In Action: The Trilemma Facing China And India

In two seminal papers, Nobel Laureate Robert Mundell and Marcus Fleming extended the basic Hicks IS-LM model to incorporate an external sector. The most interesting finding is what’s called the Trilemma – a country cannot simultaneously have exchange rate stability, free capital mobility and an independent monetary policy. You can at best target two of these variables, with the third left to market forces. Trying to achieve all three is effectively impossible, as it sets up inconsistencies in the economy that can and will be exploited by economic agents (read: financial markets).

That’s the real basis for the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis a decade ago – you can’t have your cake and eat it too. Most of the crisis victims opted for dropping exchange rate stability; Malaysia famously choose to drop capital mobility, then in 2005 followed the others towards exchange rate flexibility as well.

However, there’s nuances to the stark choices implied by Mundell-Fleming. In this new paper highlighted at VoxEU, the Trilemma choices are evaluated for China and India (excerpt; emphasis added):

The financial trilemma in China and a comparative analysis with India
Joshua Aizenman Rajeswari Sengupta

Emerging markets face what some economists are calling a trilemma. They cannot simultaneously target exchange-rate stability, conduct an independent monetary policy, and have full financial integration. So what to do? This column looks at how Asia’s giants are responding – and in different ways...

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Credit Rating Agencies In The Spotlight

The IMF says that markets should reduce their reliance on credit ratings (excerpts, emphasis added):

Reducing Role of Credit Ratings Would Aid Markets
By John Kiff

New IMF analysis says that ratings have inadvertently contributed to financial instability—in financial markets during the recent global crisis and, more recently, with regard to sovereign debt.

The analysis, in the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report, recommends that regulators reduce their reliance on credit ratings as much as possible and increase their oversight of the agencies that assign the ratings used in regulations...

...In the case of sovereign debt, the IMF said in the report released September 29, the problem does not lie entirely with the ratings themselves, but with overreliance on ratings by market participants, coupled with deleterious selloffs of securities when they are abruptly downgraded — called “cliff effects.”…

Friday, July 16, 2010

Have PhD, Will Travel

On VoxEU.org today:

Introducing a free database of nearly all jobs for PhD economists

To help grow the next generation of economists, VoxEU.org has teamed with walras.org to form the world’s largest database of job openings for PhD economists. In addition to this comprehensive database of nearly all job openings for PhDs in economics and related fields, our partner walras.org also offers a free online application system allowing the exchange of all application documents and reference letters.

VoxEU are based on Europe, but I doubt they’ll restrict entries to just that region as they also host articles from economists around the globe.

So if you have a PhD in economics or working towards one, feel free to visit (and don’t forget to share your experiences!).

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Recent Imposition Of Capital Controls In East Asia

An interesting piece of research has turned up on VoxEU (excerpt):

Emerging markets consider capital controls to regulate speculative capital flows
Kavaljit Singh

Despite recovering faster than developed countries, many emerging markets are struggling to cope with large capital inflows. This column discusses the recent capital controls imposed by Indonesia and South Korea. It argues that while the international community is warming to these policies, it would be wrong to view capital controls as a panacea...

...Just days before the G20 summit in Toronto, South Korea and Indonesia announced several policy measures to regulate potentially destabilising capital flows which could pose a threat to their economies and financial systems...

...Despite recovering faster than developed countries, many emerging markets are finding it difficult to cope with large capital inflows. There is a growing concern that the loose monetary and fiscal policies currently adopted by many developed countries are promoting a large dollar “carry trade” to buy assets in emerging markets.

Apart from currency appreciation pressures, the fears of inflation and asset bubbles are very strong in many emerging markets. Since mid-2009, stock markets in emerging economies have witnessed a spectacular rally due to strong capital inflows. In particular, Brazil, Russia, India and China are the major recipient of capital inflows.

The signs of asset price bubbles are more pronounced in Asia as the region’s economic growth will continue to outperform the rest of the world. As a result, the authorities are adopting a cautious approach towards hot money flows and considering a variety of policy measures (from taxing specific sectors to capital controls) to regulate such flows. In May 2010, for instance, Hong Kong and China imposed new measures in an attempt to curb soaring real estate prices and prevent a property bubble.

In emerging markets, strong capital inflows are likely to persist due to favourable growth prospects but the real challenge is to how to control and channel such inflows into productive economy.

Contrary to the popular perception, capital controls have been extensively used by both the developed and developing countries in the past. There is a paradox between the use of capital controls in theory and in practice (Nembhard 1996). Although mainstream theory suggests that controls are distortionary and ineffective, several successful economies have used them in the past (Nembhard 1996). China and India, two major Asian economies and “success stories” of economic globalisation, still use capital controls today...

...Yet it would be incorrect to view capital controls as a panacea to all the ills plaguing the present-day global financial system. It needs to be underscored that capital controls must be an integral part of regulatory and supervisory measures to maintain financial and macroeconomic stability (Singh 2000). Any wisdom that considers capital controls as short-term and isolated measures is unlikely to succeed in the long run.

The theoretical (or should I say theological) basis for an open capital account, where capital of any sort is allowed to enter and leave freely, is that capital will flow to where it can be used most productively (i.e. where capital is relatively scarce, and would then attract higher returns). An open capital account should therefore result in lower cost of capital for the recipient, which will result in an increase in investment in productive capital which then raises incomes and social welfare. That’s the free-market, neo-classical story anyway.

The problem here is that there is an underlying assumption that the country involved is big enough that capital inflows/outflows won’t have a significant impact on monetary conditions – that’s simply not true of many developing economies in the context of a relatively more massive global financial system. (I’m leaving out here the empirical “puzzle” that capital doesn’t in fact flow to capital-scarce nations – quite the opposite actually occurs. Otherwise, Africa would be the number one destination of foreign capital and investment).

There are a number of ways a country can manage outsized capital inflows and outflows – reserve accumulation as an insurance policy, as is common in East Asia and the oil-rich Middle East; sterilisation through issuance of central bank liabilities, which can get expensive; and of course capital controls.

The general practice has been that if the domestic financial sector and capital markets don’t have the capacity, breadth or depth to absorb large-scale short-term capital, then capital controls are the instrument of choice, never mind investor opprobrium. Malaysia has had more than a few brushes with capital controls, of which 1998 was just the latest.

At the moment, capital flows aren’t an overriding concern here (we’re not as “exciting” an investment story as Indonesia, China or India), but that may change if interest rates and yields in developing countries remain ultra-low for an extended period.

Technical Notes:

Singh, Kavaljit, “Emerging markets consider capital controls to regulate speculative capital flows”, VoxEU.org, July 5 2010

Friday, November 20, 2009

Talking Stimulus; Or Why Fiscal Deficits Might Fail To Boost Economies

This article on VoxEU caused a stir in the economics blogosphere went it first appeared. I’d originally intended to post on this much earlier, but for a number of reasons I’ve sat on it for a while. What’s interesting is that the underlying research attempts to measure the impact of government fiscal deficits on GDP – that amorphous quantity known as the fiscal multiplier.

There are two contending views on the fiscal multiplier – Keynesians of course contend that the multiplier is positive and above unity i.e. for every dollar spent by the government, GDP expands by more than a dollar. The opposite viewpoint, typically associated with monetarists and Neo-classicals, is that the multiplier is below unity, and at the extreme can actually be negative. Empirical investigations into the question have yielded a range of estimates from zero to well over 2, which means the question is far from settled.

The paper explains why there’s such a diversity of estimates – fiscal policy is equally diverse in its application, the structure of the economy matters, monetary policy reaction matters, as does the position of the economy relative to full employment output. The methodology at arriving at the estimates also matters enormously (check the paper’s critical appraisal of the Obama government’s estimates). So the real answer is: it depends.

Here are some of the key issues (not limited to the discussion in the paper):

1. The output gap – the greater the gap between the current level of output and full employment output, the greater the likely impact of fiscal spending. This is the prototypical Keynesian argument, and one Neo-classicals have a hard time with. Why? Because under the assumption of complete and fully clearing markets, by construction unemployment cannot exist. You then get howlers like, “people must be demanding more leisure time,” in an attempt to explain the drop in employment.

2. Crowding out – the effectiveness of fiscal spending depends on its use of available resources. The Keynesian argument is that since output is below capacity, idle resources can be used by the government to boost economic activity back to full employment level. However if resources (both real and financial) are not idle, then government spending partially or fully replaces private sector spending, and the multiplier must be less than one and at the limit, zero.

3. Central bank independence – the more optimistic estimates of fiscal multipliers generally have one thing in common, which is that they assume no change in monetary policy. But deficit spending requires raising government debt, which in turn pushes up interest rates. How a central bank would react to that depends on how independent it is and the outlook for inflation. If inflation is low or there is deflation, monetary expansion is called for which would tend to exaggerate the effect of fiscal expenditure. But over the medium term to long term, as output picks up, inflation should rise and monetary tightening will reduce the stimulus impact. Over time then, the multiplier should therefore be declining. Under full employment of course, independent central banks would act to offset the inflationary impact of increased government spending, and it’s more than possible that under such circumstances the fiscal multiplier can actually be negative.

4. Trade openness – another key assumption of the Keynesian argument is that government spending falls mainly on local production of goods and services. If it doesn’t, then the impact of government expenditure is actually lost to the economy, as it “leaks” to other countries. This was explicitly tested in the paper and found to be a significant factor – more “open” economies tended to have lower multipliers.

5. Structural fiscal spending – policy choices matter. Tax cuts and rebates will have different effects on the economy then construction projects, although as a rule, direct spending will have the higher multiplier.

In addition, the paper finds that multipliers in developing countries as well as highly indebted countries vare lower than in developed countries, but higher for countries with fixed exchange rates than for countries with flexible exchange rates.

Do these estimates apply to Malaysia? I’ve off and on been monitoring whether any research has been conducted on the fiscal multiplier(s) for Malaysia – believe it or not, I have yet to find any empirical research into this question. If anybody knows of any, please let me know.

The authors of the paper unfortunately don’t list the countries included in their sample, although it’s a mix of 45 developed and undeveloped economies (it’s an unbalanced panel VAR regression – I presume Malaysia is included). But even so you can’t directly take their estimates as applying to Malaysia, as panel studies lose country specific information. It’s quite possible (probable) that you get unbiased statistically significant aggregate estimates, yet have one or more countries in the sample with wildly different experiences.

But looking at the list of factors above (as well as the estimates from the paper), it’s hard to be confident that fiscal stimulus would have much impact on the Malaysian economy. While I accept the basic Keynesian premise that in the presence of an output gap and idle resources (little or no crowding out effect) expanded fiscal expenditure can be desirable, the mitigating factors mean that any impact will leak from the economy resulting in a low multiplier.

Here’s why I think so: first is the relative openness of the economy. The authors of the paper use a threshold of total trade exceeding 60% of GDP to define open and non-open economies; the ratio for Malaysia exceeds 200%. Also, the evidence on the Balassa-Samuelson effect on Malaysia is inconclusive, where studies usually take government consumption as a proxy for spending on non-tradables. What that means to me is that there’s a high import element in government spending.

Think about the structure of the March 2009 stimulus package for instance. Only about RM20b+ can properly be called stimulus spending, out of which most are construction projects. The reason for this policy choice is that construction typically (from previous studies in developed countries) has a high multiplier effect. But in Malaysia’s case, construction labour is mainly foreign and a lot of raw materials are sourced overseas. While we’d get a long term benefit from the infrastructure created, the short to medium term impact on GDP is already half-lost at the outset. Given the import content of some of our domestically produced and consumed goods as well, I’m not sure that tax cuts or rebates would be any better.

Second, Malaysia is definitely not a high income economy, so if we take the estimates from the paper, the impact is indistinguishable from zero. And third, the Ringgit is relatively flexible (well I think so anyway), which should also means a low multiplier.

So why bother with deficit spending? Under the current circumstances I can think of only one, albeit very good, reason. While taken individually, Malaysia and its trade partners would be “open” economies, in aggregate the world is a “closed” economy. That means aggregate excess fiscal spending will have an impact somewhere, even if the benefits do not fall wholly on the country spending the money. There’s no doubt that China’s massive stimulus spending over the past year helped pull East Asia very quickly out of recession. Malaysia’s fiscal spending therefore is in effect our contribution to reflating the global economy, not just Malaysia’s alone.

The risk here is we beget a “free rider” problem – if only one country is doing the spending, they bear the cost while gaining less of the benefit. Fiscal rectitude on the part of their trade partners under those circumstances would amount to being bad global citizens. Also pertinent is that the US stimulus spending could have the paradoxical effect of exacerbating global trade and capital imbalances that helped start this whole mess in the first place. Hence the calls for coordinated international action in stimulus spending earlier this year; and the talk about the need for coordination when withdrawing stimulus spending, which should presumably happen later next year. So under the circumstances, where we have had a synchronous global downturn, there are solid grounds for fiscal deficit spending.

Just let’s not get the politicians too comfortable spending taxpayers’ money when we get out of this.

Ethan Ilzetzki, Enrique G. Mendoza & Carlos A. Vegh, “How big are fiscal multipliers? New evidence from new data”. Link to full paper here.

Sunday, March 8, 2009

Links of the Day

Esther Duflo says we can't trust bankers:

"There is another argument, implicit or explicit, for the nationalisation of banks; we can not trust bankers not to leave with the cash, let alone spend any assistance whatsoever in the general interest. Two recent studies that analyse the experience of recent years show that they will not hesitate to enrich themselves at the expense of the public good if they have the opportunity."

Willem Buiter offers a stinging critique of modern macroeconomics:

"In both the New Classical and New Keynesian approaches to monetary theory (and to aggregative macroeconomics in general), the strongest version of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) was maintained. This is the hypothesis that asset prices aggregate and fully reflect all relevant fundamental information, and thus provide the proper signals for resource allocation. Even during the seventies, eighties, nineties and noughties before 2007, the manifest failure of the EMH in many key asset markets was obvious to virtually all those whose cognitive abilities had not been warped by a modern Anglo-American Ph.D. education."