Historical Revisionism Redux

P. Gunasegaran demonstrates – yet again – that he doesn’t understand exchange rates (excerpt):

How successive governments impoverished M'sians

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS | At least two ways - both very wrong in the longer term - were used to support the export sector in Malaysia in believing that growth through exports was the right thing for a developing country like Malaysia.

But even though there was economic growth, which means more wealth was created, there was impoverishment too. But how could that be? Basically, those who were rich got richer and those who were poor got poorer.

How did the government achieve export competitiveness over the years? Through two measures. First, they reduced the number of things Malaysians generally could buy by going for a policy which weakened the ringgit. And two, they imported poverty by allowing the uncontrolled import of cheap labour.

An Obsession With Surpluses

No, I’m not addressing the government deficit. Rather this is about Malaysia’s (slowly) diminishing current account surplus. I wrote about it at length last year (link), but here’s another flavour of the same argument (abstract):

Current Account Deficits:The Australian Debate
Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell and Christopher Kent

This paper documents the clear change of view, which has taken place in Australia over the past three decades or so, concerning the relevance of the current account deficit for policy. Historical experience under a fixed exchange rate regime suggested that large persistent deficits were unsustainable and could leave the economy vulnerable to sudden reversals in sentiment. These concerns persisted after the floating of the Australian dollar and financial deregulation, and it was thought that all arms of policy should help to rein in the then much larger current account deficits. However, these policies were shown to be ineffective and, by the early 1990s, the argument that current account deficits represent the optimal outcomes of decisions made by ‘consenting adults’ gained wide support. This paper presents some empirical evidence consistent with optimal smoothing in the face of temporary shocks; the persistence of the deficit is attributed to a modest degree of impatience relative to the rest of the world. Although it is now widely accepted that policy should not seek to influence the current account balance, the issue of external vulnerability remains of interest. Here, country-specific considerations are important, and it is argued that the factors that have made Australia relatively resilient to external shocks are also those that helped to attract foreign capital in the first place.

It's an old paper, but still relevant. I'll note in passing here two things:

1. The underlying argument is similar to my own – whether the current account is in surplus or deficit (and the extent of that imbalance) is primarily driven by factors in the domestic economy, not the external sector or the exchange rate;
2. Australia now has almost no FX reserves to speak of, despite being heavily exposed to trade and commodity prices, and a foreign presence in their bond market that exceeds ours. IIRC, they barely have one month cover of retained imports.

The implication is that all adjustments take place in prices instead of levels i.e. the AUD exchange rate adjusts, not their level of reserves. Despite this difference, the MYRAUD cross rate is one of the most stable I’ve ever seen outside of a pegged exchange rate. Or to put it more bluntly – despite not having accumulated “insurance” (FX reserves) against capital outflows, and thus deliberately exposing the exchange rate to greater volatility, the AUD does not appear to be any more volatile than the MYR is. There was an exception to this, running roughly from October 2008-May 2009, coinciding with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and running to the beginnings of the global recovery. But this was more the exception that proved the rule.

Notes:

Rochelle Belkar, Lynne Cockerell and Christopher Kent, "Current Account Deficits:The Australian Debate", Reserve Bank of Australia Discussion Paper 2007-02, March 2007

Historical Revisionism: The MYR and SGD in the 1980s

I came across this a couple of weeks ago, but didn’t have time to address it then (excerpt):

A kleptocracy premium for the ringgit
P Gunasegaram

A QUESTION OF BUSINESS | Without a doubt the ringgit is historically rather weak even if the economy still continues to grow at a relatively healthy pace – the latest figures show a good growth of 5.8% for the second quarter of the year….

…So why does the ringgit remain weak, trading at levels which are weaker than at the height of the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis? What is it that is happening that keeps the ringgit level depressed? Perhaps it is due to a risk premium on the ringgit following the emergence of kleptocracy (re: 1MDB where as much as RM40 billion could be at risk, as thieves dip their fingers into money borrowed by a government company via bond issues) or apprehension over the ongoing spate of mega projects (re: the RM55 billion East Coast Rail Link whose cost may go to over RM100 billion….

In the Shadow of the Hegemon

David Beckworth thinks the Fed is the global central bank (excerpt):

The Monetary Superpower: As Strong As Ever

[A] defining feature of the US financial system is that its central bank, the Federal Reserve, has inordinate influence over global monetary conditions. Because of this influence, it shapes the growth path of global aggregate demand more than any other central bank does. This global reach of the Federal Reserve arises for three reasons.

ICYMI: Talking FX on BFM

Me, pontificating on the Ringgit and BNM’s new measures, over the past week:

FX: Onshore Versus Offshore

Imagine you have a widget to sell, something that helps pick apples. You offer the widget to a bunch of apple farmers, who think, yes, very useful, and offer you a price for it. Then you go to another set of orange growers and offer the same widget, and they’ll say, well we could use it, but its a different shape, and offer you a price half of what you got before (I’m assuming away the ability to arbitrage).

In essence, that’s the problem facing central banks with currencies traded both onshore and offshore – while the product’s the same, the market players are different and you’ll get different prices as a result.

Ramadhan Ruminations

Throwing this out there because this is a narrative that really ought to change:

In the runup to BNM’s latest MPC, there was a lot of market speculation that BNM should cut the OPR, because the numbers appear to justify it (lower credit growth, poor business and consumer sentiment, slowing GDP growth etc). In fact, even as the MPC stayed on hold, there continues to be opinions out there that a rate cut is and should be in the offing, with some thinking that the weakness in the MYR vis-a-vis the USD is what’s holding the central bank back from easing monetary policy.

Under different circumstances, I’d fully agree that monetary policy should be loosened. But I think in the present case, the narrative should be turned on its head, as I think the causality runs the other way.

Exchange Rates Are Relative Prices

I used this analogy  in a conversation last week, and its too apt not to publish it.

Imagine you’re in the stock market and trying to evaluate two different stocks. Now, fundamental based analysis would look at earnings, book value, gearing, corporate strategy and so on, and come up with a target price for the stocks which reflects what the price of a stock should be.

What To Do About The Ringgit

My advice to BNM and the government, not that they need it, would essentially be the following:

Monetary Policy and the Yuan

In a shock move yesterday, the PBOC announced a sharp downward revision in the Yuan’s reference rate, with another one coming today. This de facto devaluation has had repercussions across the world, with some speculating that it would even put the Fed off from raising interest rates in September. It’s certainly the catalyst for the Ringgit moving past RM4.00 to the USD this morning.

There’s all kinds of speculation as to why (the devaluation I mean). Off hand, I would say the notion of currency war and regaining trade competitiveness is grossly mistaken. With regionally distributed production chains, the impact of FX changes on competitiveness have gradually been disappearing.

Friedman On Pegging

I’ve got the book*, but I’m too lazy to type it all out, so I’m quoting Friedman’s thoughts on this from my friend Lar’s post (excerpt):

Milton Friedman on exchange rates #4

...Despite Milton Friedman typically – and rightly – being labelled as the standard bearer for floating exchange rates, he often stresses that the choice is not easy, and he has repeatedly emphasised that countries have achieved both good and bad results with fixed and floating exchange rates. He points out for example that in 1985 Israel successfully implemented a fixed exchange rate policy against the dollar that helped cut inflation without causing any negative long-term economic repercussions.

Ringgit Fallacies: Imported Inflation and International Reserves

Another week, another multi-year low for the Ringgit. Since BNM appears to have stopped intervening, the Ringgit has continued to weaken against the USD, to what appears to be everyone’s consternation. There is this feeling that BNM should do something, anything, to halt the slide – cue: rumours over another Ringgit peg and capital controls.

To me, this is all a bit silly. Why should BNM lift a finger? Both economic theory and the empirical evidence is very clear – in the wake of a terms of trade shock, the real exchange rate should depreciate, even if it overshoots. NOT doing so would create a situation where the currency would be fundamentally overvalued, and we would therefore be risking another 1997-98 style crisis. Note the direction of causality here – it isn’t the weakening of the exchange rate that gave rise to the crisis, but rather the avoidance of the adjustment.

Pegging the currency under these circumstances would be spectacularly stupid. I’ll have more to say about this in my next post.

Commodity Prices and the Exchange Rate Again

My friend Lars Christensen has a good post (video here) on oil prices and Middle East currency regimes (excerpt):

Talking to my phone: The Gulf States should peg their FX rates to oil prices

Oops I did it again – this time I talk to my phone about monetary policy in the Gulf States and my suggestion that these countries should peg their currencies to the oil price or a basket of the oil price and the US dollar. This is of course what I have suggested should be termed the Export Price Norm (EPN).

I’m posting this due to a conversation I had yesterday, trying to explain optimal exchange rate policy in the face of a terms of trade shock.

Lars has an older post on the Ringgit as well (here), along with thoughts on monetary policy, price controls and inflation.

The Facts Of Life: Singapore’s Monetary Policy And The SGD Exchange Rate

Since the Ringgit has recovered (a little) there’s probably less of a need for this post. But given how angst ridden Malaysians are about Singapore and the Singapore Dollar (one commentator described it as humiliating), it’s probably still appropriate.

So here’s my take on this subject, and given how TDM is in the news so much these days, done “che det” style:

1. Once upon a time, the SGDMYR exchange rate was at parity. Now however, SGD1 buys MYR2.67. This is popularly viewed as a barometer of how badly the Malaysian economy has done vis-a-vis Singapore.

2. However, this would only be true if the SGD was a free floating currency. It is not; it is in actuality a policy variable.

To Peg Or Not To Peg Part II: FX Intervention Under A Floating Rate Regime

FX intervention is de rigueur under a fixed exchange rate regime – it’s a basic requirement to maintain exchange rate parity.

But there’s also, for various reasons, FX intervention in floating rate regimes. Leaving aside soft pegs, crawling pegs, snakes and the like, how effective is FX intervention under a largely free float?

I don’t think it’s very effective at all.

Currency Manipulation and Economic Sabotage

This started circulating on blogs and social media sometime late last week:

How Tong Kooi Ong is attempting to break Bank Negara and crash the RM

An owner of a prominent news media empire is casting undue influence on the financial and political state of Malaysia for his own personal monetary gain.

Sources within Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) revealed that Tong Kooi Ong, the owner of the Edge Group and The Malaysian Insider has taken a USD1.4 billion short position on the Ringgit through a proxy. The first transaction took place in August 2014 and subsequent short positions have been taken leading up to January 2015….

To Peg Or Not To Peg

This question has been coming out a bit lately, so let me try heading off any more of this nonsense before it gets any more steam.

With the Ringgit declining, some of the those with long enough memories remember what happened in 1997-1998. In September 1998, Malaysia imposed “drastic measures” – we fixed the value of the Ringgit at RM3.80 to the USD and instituted capital controls. That halted the downward spiral of the Ringgit, and allowed BNM to regain control of domestic monetary policy. So people wonder, why not peg again?

Here’s the problem with that narrative.

The Latest, But Not The Last, Domino To Fall

In a surprise move, MAS has just eased their policy target (excerpt; emphasis added):

MAS Monetary Policy Statement

1. Since the last Monetary Policy Statement in October, developments in the global and domestic inflation environment have led to a significant shift in Singapore’s CPI inflation outlook for 2015. As part of its ongoing economic surveillance, MAS has assessed that it is appropriate to adjust the prevailing monetary policy stance.

2. In October 2014, MAS maintained a modest and gradual appreciation path of the S$NEER (Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate) policy band, with no change to its slope, width, and the level at which it was centred. This policy stance, which has been in place since April 2012, was assessed to be appropriate for containing domestic and imported sources of inflation and for anchoring inflation expectations.

Policy Analysis Isn’t For The Faint Of Heart

I read what I considered really bizarre articles in the Star last Saturday.

First, from Tan Sri Lin See Yan on the current turmoil in the currency and commodity markets. After noting the similarities with the 1990s and the divergent moves by central banks trying to restart growth, he says (excerpt; emphasis added):

A dismal world where oil and currencies are causing havoc

...Still, currency markets remain in turmoil. The recent abrupt move by Switzerland to remove the cap on its franc peg to the euro sent global markets reeling. This prompted the Wall Street Journal’s leader: “Murder in Zurich.” The Swiss franc had since revalued 20% against the euro.

Pressure is now on the Danish krone peg. It signals an end to stable money and a setback for growth. It blew a hole in Japan’s quantative easing (QE) strategy by undermining the credibility of central banks. So, the Swiss National Bank had to move or get run over. Currency market tumult harms. How will China respond to the challenge posed by a much weaker euro, yen and won? If Beijing caves-in and adopts the already in vogue beggar-thy-neighbour stance, ripples can become tidal waves. As I see it, the world has little choice but to go for a globally managed exchange regime.

Living In The Past

As we say in BM, “mamat ni ketinggalan zaman” (excerpt):

‘Time to slash projects involving usage of foreign reserves’

Malaysia is expected to experience two to three years of slower growth rate due to the current stifling economic conditions, says independent analyst Prof Dr Hoo Ke Ping.

Pointing out that Malaysia’s current foreign reserves had depleted significantly since the 2015 Budget was tabled, the government and its people must be prepared for the worst case scenario.